Exploring the Impact of the EU’s Promotion of Regional and Inter-regional Processes in the Black Sea Region through Science Diplomacy. EL-CSID Working paper Issue 2017/7 • September 2017 by Boers, Elke
Working paper
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES)
Exploring the Impact of  
the EU’s Promotion of  
Regional and Inter-regional 
Processes in the Black Sea 
Region through Science 
Diplomacy
Issue 2017/7 • September 2017
This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-
gramme under grant agreement No 693799 as part of the “European Leadership in Cultural, Science
and Innovation Diplomacy” (EL-CSID) project. It reflects only the author's view.
Elke Boers
Working paper 
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 
2
Contents
List of Abbreviations    4
1. Introduction  6
2. The STI landscape in the Black Sea Region  7
3. Willingness  9
3.1 Inclusion of SD goals in Black Letter Law and Policy  9
3.1.1 Regionalism  10
3.1.2 Inter-Regionalism  13
3.2 Presence of Committed Leaders in the Member States and EU Institutions  14
4. Capacity  15
4.1 Engaged and Skilled Professionals  15
4.2 Investing Financial Resources on SD  16
5. Acceptance  17
5.1 Buy-in from National and Regional Politicians  17
5.2 Acceptance Beyond the EU: Other Regional and International Organisations  18
6. Conclusions  19




The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 
3
List of Abbreviations 
BS- Black Sea 
BSEC- Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSH- Black Sea Horizon
BSR- Black Sea Region
BSS- Black Sea Synergy
EaP- Eastern Partnership
EC- European Commission
ENI- European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP- European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI- European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
ERA- European Research Area
EU- European Union
FP6- 6th Research Framework Programme
FP7- 7th Research Framework Programme 
GERD- gross domestic expenditure on research and development
ICBSS- International Center for Black Sea Studies
OECD- Organisation of Economic Cooperation for Development
R&D- Research and Development
S&T- Science and Technology
STI- Science, Technology and Innovation
SD- Science Diplomacy
USSR- Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Working paper 
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 
4
Abstract
Building on the analytical tools defined by 
Kingah, Amaya & Van Langenhove (2016) for 
Work Package 5 of the EL-CSID project, this 
paper assesses the willingness, capacity and 
acceptance of EU SD policies in the Black Sea 
Region (BSR). This qualitative mapping looks 
at science initiatives that aimed to enhance re-
gional cooperation, both in the BSR itself and 
between those countries and the EU. There has 
been widespread commitment and willingness 
from the EU and the BSR to involve in science 
cooperation projects, and the projects under 
FP6, FP7 and H2020 did not face acceptance is-
sues from national or regional leaders. Howev-
er, implementation of the envisaged objectives 
and Action Plans has been quite often lacking 
or incomplete due to capacity issues or weak 
political commitment. Much more needs to be 
done in this area if the EU and the BS countries 
want to reach the full potential of the H2020 
projects. On the other hand, a broader political 
framework that shows a clear vision of the EU 
towards the BSR is lacking, as the Black Sea 
Synergy (BSS) has been inactive and the East-
ern Partnership has been gaining more momen-
tum and thus overshadowed the BSS. Moreover, 
political tensions in the BSR will push the EU to 
opt for a more careful approach towards the re-
gion, where either all stakeholders will have to 
be better involved, or some stakeholders should 
be left out to ensure a better functioning of fu-
ture projects. 
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1. Introduction
When Bulgaria and Romania acceded the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) in 2007, it was the fi rst time 
that Black Sea (BS) littoral countries were ac-
cepted into the union and that ‘the EU reached 
the Black Sea shores’ (Manoli, 2010: 323). Be-
fore this, EU cooperation with the Black Sea 
countries had been rather limited. The acces-
sion of Bulgaria and Romania was one of the 
main incentives for the EU to draw up its Black 
Sea Synergy (BSS) initiative1. This was a loose 
framework underpinning three other EU policies 
that involved the majority of the BS countries 
and would showcase the EU’s political willing-
ness to become more involved in the region. The 
BSS’ intention was not to form new organisa-
tions, but to work closely with already existing 
ones; in particular with the Organization of the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)2 and 
the International Centre for Black Sea Studies 
(ICBSS)3. The BSEC had already been founded 
in 1992 by Turkey and the Russian Federation, 
right after the implosion of the Soviet Union. 
Regional cooperation, however, has proven to 
be challenging. Not only the recent geopoliti-
cal developments, but also unresolved ‘frozen’ 
confl icts and past confl icts that are still fresh in 
the collective memory, remain hurdles that are 
yet to be overcome.  Intraregional trade fl ows 
remain low, despite the deepening network of 
multilevel cooperation. An example of this is the 
regional agreement between Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM), who agreed 
upon a free trade agreement in 2003. A decade 
later, intra-GUAM trade was still extremely low. 
Only Russia is an important regional trade part-
ner for most BS states, but this is because of its 
natural oil and gas exports (Manoli, 2012: 437). 
In this context, it is interesting to explore if and 
to what extent the EU’s Science Diplomacy (SD)4 
initiatives in the Black Sea Region (BSR) have 
been effective in promoting regional and inter-
regional processes. This working paper will as-
sess the effectiveness of SD through the analyt-
ical tools provided by Van Langenhove (2017: 8) 
and Kingah, Amaya & Van Langenhove (2016). 
These tools are centred on the qualitative indi-
cators of willingness, capacity and acceptance. 
These dimensions have been put forward as a 
conceptual model to study actorness in Interna-
tional relations, and can equally determine the 
impact of the EU’s Science Diplomacy policy to-
wards the Black Sea Region. Willingness can be 
assessed by looking if stakeholders have their 
abilities labelled as Science Diplomacy and if 
they want to mobilise science for diplomacy 
goals. The EU’s willingness to act in this fi eld 
could therefore be measured by the existence 
of policy tools such as treaties and agreements 
and the existence of visionary leaders. Also the 
capacities of the EU can be assessed by map-
ping the available fi nancial resources and in-
struments that were used for this specifi c policy 
area. One can also evaluate the Acceptance of 
involved actors, such as the regional scientifi c 
communities, regional organisations and na-
tional actors (Van Langenhove, 2017: 8; Kingah, 
Amaya & Van Langenhove, 2016: 5). 
The fi rst section will have a look at the general 
Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) land-
scape in the Black Sea Region in order to bet-
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ter grasp regional trends and how EU policies 
fit in this context. The next section will look at 
the willingness of the EU to engage in SD initia-
tives with the BSR by examining official policies 
and looking for black letter law commitment to 
engage in SD and subsequently to enhance re-
gional and inter-regional tendencies with these 
policies. Also the presence of committed lead-
ers at the EU level is a requirement to assess 
willingness. The third section will discuss the 
second qualitative indicator of capacity, which 
looks at the presence of engaged and skilled 
professionals and the availability of financial 
resources that are channelled towards science 
initiatives. The last indicator is acceptance and 
will be assessed by looking at the buy-in from 
national and regional leaders and at coopera-
tion with other regional and international organ-
isations in the region in the STI sector. In addi-
tion, a short general overview of the region for 
the sub-indicators regionalism and interregion-
alism and the indicator acceptance will be given 
in order to better assess the effectiveness of EU 
policies in promoting regional and inter-regional 
processes in science.
2. The STI landscape in the Black Sea 
Region
To assess the EU’s influence on the region 
through its science cooperation initiatives, a 
closer look at the broader STI landscape in the 
BSR and its countries is needed. In general, all 
BS countries have been making efforts these 
past two decades to strengthen their regional 
economic and institutional ties (of which the 
BSEC is a good example), but they still have a 
long way ahead to catch up to the dynamic mid-
dle-income countries’ STI policy environment 
and the levels of investment in the related sec-
tors. In terms of (higher) education, however, the 
region is doing extremely well, especially when 
compared to developed countries for the gross 
tertiary enrolment rate. Gender equality is a re-
ality in most Black Sea countries as a very high 
percentage of PhD graduates is female. Only in 
Turkey the gender balance between researchers 
has been going down, especially in the private 
sector and in decision-making circles5 (Eröcal, 
D. &Yegorov, I., 2015: 315). 
The economies of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Turkey have been growing faster 
than those of the high-income countries, but 
gross domestic expenditure on research and 
development (GERD) has never recovered in 
the former Soviet Republics in comparison to 
the high levels in 1989 (Eröcal, D. &Yegorov, I., 
2015: 315). Only Turkey has headed in the op-
posite direction with its GERD/GDP ratio hitting 
as high as 0.95% in 2013. This share was even 
elevated in 2015 up to 1.06% (Turkish Statistical 
Institute: 2015). In Turkey and Ukraine, there are 
also remarkably more researchers being hired 
in the business sector than in other Black Sea 
Basin countries. However, the quality of the out-
put is quite low, and the institutional structure 
of the Turkish STI system remains highly cen-
tralized (Eröcal, D. &Yegorov, I., 2015: 321). 
In Romania, the innovation system is also primar-
ily based in the public sector as only 30% of the 
country’s R&D is performed by the business sec-
tor. Bulgaria and Romania’s scientific output was 
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among the lowest in the EU but it has improved 
significantly over the past five years, as signifi-
cant policy measures have been introduced to 
boost public-private cooperation (Hollanders, H. 
& Kanerva, M., 2015:267). But Moldova, which 
has one of the lowest levels of GDP per capita in 
Europe and the lowest in the BSR, has watched 
its science system declining, even though there 
have been many reforms and closer ties with the 
EU in R&I. Given the emigration and brain drain 
trends in Moldova, the number of researchers per 
million inhabitants has stagnated at a level far 
below those of other BS countries, and the num-
ber of new doctorate graduates per 1 000 aged 
25–34 is less than a fifth of the EU average (Erö-
cal, D. &Yegorov, I., 2015: 331).
In Ukraine, the economy has been shrinking, 
mostly because of the ongoing conflict in the 
east, and saw his GDP dropping by 6% in 2014. 
The successive crises have eroded R&D spend-
ing and although all Ukrainian governments in 
the past decade have announced plans to re-
structure the economy to make it more innova-
tive and competitive, rather limited measures 
have been envisaged to improve knowledge cir-
culation, to meet business knowledge demands 
and to increase resource mobilization in the pri-
vate sector. Ukrainian research and innovation 
policy with respect to industry is also almost 
exclusively focused on direct state support for 
the six national academies of sciences, state-
owned companies and state universities (Erö-
cal, D. &Yegorov, I., 2015: 338).
In Russia, paradoxically, the rapid economic 
growth fuelled by the commodities boom be-
tween 2000 and 2008 weakened the motivation 
of enterprises to modernise. In the past few 
years, the government has sought to reverse 
this trend by encouraging companies, public re-
search institutes and universities to innovate. 
Some 60 state-owned companies were obliged 
to implement special programmes to boost in-
novation (Gokhberg, L. & Kuznetsova, T., 2015: 
343). The government also invested more on 
R&D during these past years. President Putin 
realised that Russia needed ‘a technological 
revolution’ and issued action plans in 2014 and 
2015 that aimed at new partnerships with for-
eign countries, especially with the fellow BRICS 
countries. In 2014, a wide array of activities was 
set in motion as part of the Russian–EU Year of 
Science, and bilateral scientific ties with the UK 
and France were strengthened. But the EU and 
US sanctions on Russia reduced cooperation in 
certain areas. In January 2015, the Minister of 
Education and Science, Dmitry Livanov, affirmed 
Russia’s stance towards science: ‘There will be 
no substantial reductions in the level of science 
funding caused by the current economic situa-
tion. I strongly believe that scientific co-opera-
tion should not depend on temporary changes 
in the economic and political situation. After all, 
the generation of new knowledge and technolo-
gies is a mutually beneficial process’ (Gokhberg, 
L. & Kuznetsova, T., 2015: 361-362).
What catches the eye when it comes to STI co-
operation in the BSR, is that all states maintain a 
balance between Eastern and Western partners. 
Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine collaborate most 
with Germany but the Russian Federation figures 
among their top four collaborators, as it does for 
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the other post-Soviet states. Poland makes an 
appearance in the top five as Ukraine’s fourth-
closest collaborator. Within the region, only Azer-
baijan counts Turkey as its closest partner in sci-
ence, but Turkey itself partners mostly with the 
USA and Western Europe (Eröcal, D. &Yegorov, I., 
2015: 321) (see Annex 2). 
3. Willingness
The desire of the EU to be an effective leader in 
CD and the effects that this may have on region-
al and inter-regional processes in the BSR can 
be captured in the following sub-elements: the 
expression of the desire to cooperate with other 
regions in the area of science in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU, in secondary legis-
lation and other relevant policy documents and 
the presence of visionary and committed lead-
ers in this field in the EU itself and EU Member 
States (Kingay, Amaya & Van langenhove, 2016: 
11). In these sub-elements, there will also be 
looked at the emphasis that is put by the EU on 
regional and inter-regional integration process-
es and the EU’s aspiration to enhance it through 
cooperation in science.
3.1 Inclusion of SD goals in Black Letter 
Law and Policy
One of the first requirements for effective EU 
leadership in SD supporting (inter) regionalism 
in the BSR is the inclusion of SD goals in black 
letter law and policy. Specifically, Articles 180 
and 186 in Title XIX in the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union make it clear that 
the EU envisages to play a role in the area of 
science cooperation. Here it is stated that co-
operation with third countries and other inter-
national organisations will be promoted in order 
to meet the research goals of the EU. Also in 
other important policy statements, the EU has 
conveyed its desire to be ‘an effective leader in 
the realm of SD’ (Kingah et al, 2016: 10).
After the very first cooperation projects had tak-
en place some years before, the EU’s regional 
cooperation initiative for the BSR was taken up 
as a complementary initiative to the already ex-
isting policies that involved most BS countries, 
in order to give more political attention to the 
region and enhance the ongoing cooperation 
process. The BSS was thus not intended as an 
independent BS strategy, as it was the Commis-
sion’s opinion that a broad EU strategy towards 
the region was already set out by three other EU 
policies: the pre-accession negotiations with 
Turkey, the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
the Strategic Partnership with Russia. The BSS 
was thus meant as a flexible framework to en-
hance coherence and ensure policy guidance 
(European Commission, 2007). However, this 
more flexible framework also resulted in policy 
pluralism towards the BSR as a variety of policy 
options applied to the region. Additionally, the 
BSS and the Eastern Partnership did not take 
into account the already existing institutional 
capacity and other regional schemes with simi-
lar agendas (Manoli, 2010: 323-329).
Among other cooperation areas, the impor-
tance of the development of environment, re-
search and education networks and science 
and technology have been underlined in the 
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BSS. It was stated that the EU intended to 
‘stimulate the interconnection of all countries 
in the area to the pan-European research back-
bone GEANT’ and that ‘legal and regulatory 
harmonization of these countries frameworks 
with the EU framework’ would be promoted. 
The Commission also emphasized its inten-
tion ‘to promote capacity-building and S&T 
policy dialogue with the Black Sea countries, 
in particular through the 7th Research Frame-
work Programme’ (European Commission, 
2007: 7). In the broader European Neighbour-
hood Policy, the importance of cooperation in 
research is also underlined as it helps to tack-
le common challenges such as energy securi-
ty, health issues, and environmental changes. 
It is also recognised that thanks to coopera-
tion in science, the economic and industrial 
competitiveness of neighbourhood partners 
will be strengthened (European External Ac-
tion Service, 2016). Also in the Eastern Part-
nership6, the importance of cooperation in 
the areas of training and youth, research and 
environment was underlined (European Com-
mission, 2008). 
3.1.1 Regionalism
In order to assess the effects of STI coopera-
tion on regionalisation processes in the BSR, 
the notion of the Black Sea states as a ‘region’ 
should be discussed first, because the ‘region-
ness’ of the Black Sea states has been contest-
ed. Namely, it was not until the implosion of the 
Soviet Union and the following foundation of 
the BSEC by Turkey and Russia in 1992, that the 
BS littoral states would express the ambition to 
work together on regional themes. Before this, 
regional cooperation was almost non-existent, 
with the exception of some cross-border trade 
cooperation. Almost no knowledge or capacity 
was available concerning on how to work to-
gether in this region. There were links between 
the BS countries, but limited, and often only with 
neighbouring countries (Manoli, 2017). This sud-
den eagerness to cooperate after the implosion 
of the Soviet Union is something what Libman 
and Vinokurov (2012: 2) have called holding-
together regionalism: ‘the integration of coun-
tries which until recently were part of a single 
political entity’. There has been a huge lack of 
attention for this post-soviet regionalism, most 
likely because it is well-known that these inte-
gration projects were relatively ineffective, es-
pecially when compared to the more successful 
coming-together integration projects such as 
the EU and the NAFTA (Libman and Vinokurov, 
2012: 2). 
Therefore, the idea that the BS states form a 
natural ‘region’ with a regional ‘identity’ has 
been widely contested (Manoli, 2012; Ciută, 
2008; Triantaphyllou, 2012 & 2016), and is some-
times even said to be a politically constructed 
idea. Surely, there are many reasons why these 
states could be seen as a region in theory (Ciută 
2008:141). First, the countries are bound by mul-
tiple security issues (energy, crime, human traf-
ficking, transport, etc.) and that they are thus 
seeking to ensure security through internalisa-
tion, institutionalisation and democratisation. 
The second one is that the countries do form a 
geopolitical entity, bound by the BS and by the 
geopolitical risks that surround them. The other 
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option is that the BS ‘project’ can be seen as a 
necessity, as they need this regional identity, 
only because it would constitute the main solu-
tion to the region’s security problems. So even if 
there is a certain political and academic agree-
ment that no feeling of ‘regionness’ exists in the 
Black Sea region, it is widely acknowledged that 
this would be needed in order to tackle regional 
problems. It would thus not only be thought-
provoking to look at this ‘regional framing’ from 
a theoretical point of view, but also from a politi-
cal one – so as to enquire why the region has 
been created. Ciută (2008: 133) phrases it like 
this: ‘As a consequence, it is also here that the 
project sees ‘region’ and ‘security’ in co-consti-
tutive terms, the achievement of each constant-
ly requiring the building of the other’.
Also, the two reasons to exist as a region form 
a paradox.  The first reason is endogenous. On 
the one hand, economic difficulties and the 
need for managing regional public goods such 
as the environment, trade and financial stabil-
ity have generated demands for regional coop-
eration, integration and policy coordination. But 
on the other hand, important security issues 
such as the unresolved secessionist conflicts 
undermine the drive for regionalism and ob-
struct collective action and institutions (Aydin 
& Triantaphyllou, 2010: 375). Therefore, in order 
to achieve better regional cooperation and for 
policy measures to have a real impact, these se-
curity issues should be solved first.
The second reason is exogenous and has re-
sulted in a balancing act of most involved 
countries: the region is namely ‘caught’ be-
tween Russian and EU-oriented development 
paradigms, which has resulted in multiple de-
signs of regional multilateralism (Manoli, 2010: 
323). This had as a result that ‘Intergovernmen-
tal groupings of variable institutionalization, 
membership and rationale have been reflect-
ing two dominant approaches: an ‘EU-centric’ 
or extra-regional one where the success of co-
operation is measured against targets set by 
Brussels and which aims at expanding EU re-
gime in the neighbourhood (such as the EaP) 
and an ‘introverted’ or intra-regional one whose 
success is measured against the deepening 
of policy coordination and integration among 
the neighbours beyond EU imperatives - such 
as Black Sea Economic Cooperation’ (Manoli 
2012: 435). 
On top of that, each BS country has been forced 
to move in rather different directions by having 
to choose between Russia’s customs union or 
an association agreement with the EU. Tensions 
arose between the Russian Federation and 
Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia when they an-
nounced their intention of signing association 
agreements with the EU to foster closer political 
ties and economic integration. This precarious 
regional situation has caused the Russian Fed-
eration and Turkey to choose for this delicate 
equilibrium in not advancing regional coopera-
tion, whilst trying to win more influence over 
the region (Triantaphyllou, 2016: 8). Because of 
these multiple issues, there is serious doubt and 
concern about the future potential of regional 
cooperation for the BS countries and about the 
future of the BSS in general (European Policy 
Centre, 2012). 
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Cooperation in science with the region initially 
started through a purely science-oriented pro-
ject under the 6th Framework Programme (FP6), 
BS-RESPOT, that was obtained through compe-
tition for EU funding. The main aim of BS-RES-
POT was identifying the most promising field 
for S&T cooperation among the BSEC countries 
and between the BSEC and the EU (European 
Commission: 2014a). It is when this initiative fi-
nalised its activities with a closing conference, 
proposals specifically for the BSR under the 
next funding programme, FP7, were submitted. 
This resulted in concrete cooperation propos-
als for three areas: environment, transport and 
energy - each package led by Romania, Greece 
or Bulgaria. The actors here were thus not only 
purely governmental: also think tanks and re-
search centres were involved. This concluding 
conference of BS-RESPOT had a long-term im-
pact, seen that it gave the incentives for a more 
formal framework under FP7. So while under 
FP6 science cooperation was still obtained 
through competitive applications, under FP7 
the EU became more politically committed to-
wards the region with the Action Plan and the 
drafting of the BSS (Manoli, 2017). Attention 
was given to regionalism as ‘the primary tasks 
of Black Sea Synergy would be the development 
of cooperation within the Black Sea region and 
between the region as a whole and the Europe-
an Union’ (European Commission, 2007: 3).
Most EU-funded initiatives are aiming at coop-
eration between the EU and the BSR, although 
some also had the specific aim of improving 
S&T cooperation in the region itself. This was 
done under FP7 after the success of BS-RES-
POT. Especially Black Sea Scene (2004-2008) 
and the following UP-GRADE Black Sea Scene 
(2009-2011) were designed to develop a com-
mon information structure in the region that 
would be maintained by the BS partners them-
selves. It was to improve access, exchange and 
quality of their data information on the Black 
Sea. In total, 51 partners were involved, of which 
43 were located in the BS countries. The scien-
tific network consisted of research institutes, 
universities and NGOs (Black Sea Scene, 2017). 
Also under the ENPI and later under the ENI 
Instrument for funding, a programme specifi-
cally aimed at the BSR was set up: the Black 
Sea Basin Programme. This programme al-
ready runs for ten years and is funded under 
the EU’s Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) pro-
gramme until 2020. This programme brings to-
gether the BS littoral states to tackle regional 
issues. An important share of this programme 
is dedicated to joint environmental monitor-
ing and raising awareness and initiating ac-
tions to reduce water pollution. There is also 
a CERES, a Research Fellowship Programme 
that enables the transnational mobility of sci-
entists in Central Europe (UEFISCDI, 2013: 19-
24). Many of the eligible countries here are 
also BS countries. Another important regional 
cooperation programme between the EU and 
eleven partner countries in Eastern Europe, 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, is INOGATE. 
This is an EU-funded assistance programme 
that aims at improving energy security and 
encouraging the production of green energy 
(INOGATE, 2017). 
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3.1.2 Inter-Regionalism
The EU’s approach towards the BSR has been a 
mix of hybrid or quasi-interregionalism (between 
the EU and a country in the BSR) and bilateral 
interregionalism (between the EU and the BSR 
as a regional group) (Baert et al., 2014: 4-6). Es-
pecially Black Sea Horizon, the new framework 
for STI dialogue between the EU and the BSR 
that has received funding from Horizon 2020, is 
a perfect example of bilateral interregionalism. 
Hybrid interregionalism proved to be more use-
ful towards the ‘big players’ in the region, such 
as Russia, Turkey and often also Ukraine, with 
whom the EU has made many bilateral agree-
ments, also in STI. Especially with Russia, S&T 
cooperation has mostly proceeded bilaterally, 
as it is ‘the EU’s scientifically most important 
non associated neighbour country’ (European 
Commission, 2016: 1). This mixed approach re-
flects well the prediction of Baert et al. (2014: 2) 
on how the rise of new national actors and the 
geopolitical shift from a unipolar to a multipolar 
world results in ‘new bilateralism’ and EU Stra-
tegic Partnerships. 
The objective of the BSS was also certainly to 
promote inter-regionalism processes, as it has 
recognised the importance of the linkages be-
tween the BSR and the neighbouring regions 
like the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and South-
Eastern Europe. The cooperation initiative was 
thus meant to have substantial ‘inter-regional 
elements, and it would also take into account 
other regional cooperation programmes sup-
ported by international organisations and third 
countries’ (European Commission, 2007: 3). 
Moreover, many efforts have been made to in-
volve the BS countries in several projects that 
aim to integrate the participating countries in 
the European Research Area (ERA) by linking 
the existing national, bilateral and regional pro-
grammes with the ERA. 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine also signed the 
EU association agreements in 2014, whilst 
Armenia is in the process of becoming an As-
sociate country (EEAS, 2017). These envisage 
the countries’ enhanced participation in Hori-
zon 20207, but the conditions under which the 
agreements were signed were significantly 
more advantageous and at a seriously reduced 
cost in comparison to the initial negotiation 
proposals to become an Associate Country. 
This full participation to H2020 will prove it-
self a huge challenge to these countries, as 
they did not have much time to fully adapt to 
the Framework Programme. Moreover, they will 
now have to contribute the same amount as the 
other countries to H2020 – although they did 
not have to pay that much for their ‘entry ticket’ 
(Bonas, 2017). The challenge will be the equal 
competition between their researchers and the 
researchers who have been participating for a 
longer time in the EU’s research and innovation 
programmes, as proposals are chosen based on 
excellence and other participants might have 
a better know-how on how to attract funding. 
Those BS countries which do not have associa-
tion agreements with the EU are also eligible for 
Framework Programme funding; moreover, pro-
jects such as ERA’s Networking on Science and 
Technology in the Black Sea (BS-ERA.NET) have 
been aiming at involving them in the Framework 
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Programme. Also Turkey actively participates 
in various European research cooperation net-
works. The country has long had close ties to 
the EU, but Science Diplomacy got off to a slow 
start under FP6 before it accelerated under the 
FP7, starting from 2007 (Eröcal, D. &Yegorov, I., 
2015: 321). Efforts are now being made to seize 
the opportunities available under the Horizon 
2020 programme (2014–2020) more fully.
There have been many STI cooperation initia-
tives that included BS countries. One of the first 
was SCOPE-EAST under FP6 and involved Ger-
many, France, Ukraine and Russia, which main 
aim was to see how national cooperation strate-
gies and the EU R&D cooperation strategy could 
be better coordinated. A programme under FP6 
and FP7, SEE ERA.NET and SEE ERA.NET PLUS, 
was another inter-regional initiative that intend-
ed to integrate the Western Balkan countries 
and research communities in the ERA. One of 
the most important programmes regarding the 
BSR was BS-ERA.NET under FP7, as it specifi-
cally aimed at integrating the BS countries into 
the ERA. However, also the programmes ERA.
NET-RUS (with Russia) and SEAS-ERA.NET (with 
the three EU sea basins) involved BS countries 
in the process of integrating STI policies in the 
ERA. Other inter-regional programmes that try 
to support and facilitate S&T policy dialogues to 
strengthen S&T cooperation are IncoNet EECA 
(with Eastern Europe and Central Asia) and In-
coNet EaP (with Eatern Partnership countries). 
The most recent (2015-2018) inter-regional 
cooperation initiative between the EU and the 
Black Sea region is Black Sea horizon, which 
aims to support the EU’s external relations with 
the region by contributing to STI dialogues and 
STI cooperation. It also tries to create a frame-
work for pooling resources and identifying 
challenging areas for cooperation in STI in the 
region. 
3.2 Presence of Committed Leaders in 
the Member States and EU Institutions
Selleslaghs (2017: 7) points out that science 
diplomacy needs to be seen as a shared com-
petence between the EU and its member states 
as there is no exclusive legal competence for 
a single European science, higher education 
and innovation policy foreseen in the European 
Treaties. Therefore, member states can carry 
out Science Diplomacy initiatives simultane-
ously with the EU, whilst complementing each 
other. This also accounts for activities with third 
countries. Germany, France and the UK are ex-
cellent examples: whilst they are leading many 
EU- led science cooperation initiatives in the 
region (see Annex 1), they also collaborate in-
tensively with these countries in pure science 
initiatives (usually without a focus on Science 
Diplomacy). They are also one of the most im-
portant partners in science for the countries in-
volved, together with the USA, the Russian Fed-
eration and Turkey (see Annex 2). 
In this context, the Commissioner for Science, 
Research and Innovation Carlos Moedas has 
several times pointed out the unique place sci-
ence and their practitioners hold on the interna-
tional stage, as he argues that science has the 
reputation of being a universal language: non-
political, non-ideological and evidence-based 
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(Moedas, 2015). He also stated that he wants 
the EU to play a more active and visible role in 
international SD, as it can keep communication 
channels open in times when it is difficult to 
maintain good political relationships with coun-
tries or regions (Moedas, 2016). 
Also, in the STI cooperation programmes, ex-
perienced leaders were chosen to enhance the 
collaboration between the EU and the BSR. Dr. 
George Bonas would be an ideal example, as he 
has been leading many STI cooperation initia-
tives between the EU and Russia, Central Asia, 
the Eastern Partnership countries, the Western 
Balkan countries, etc. Under his expertise, many 
Action Plans on S&T and capacity building pro-
jects (among which the IncoNet programmes) 
have been drafted. Many other people who have 
been successful in early STI cooperation pro-
grammes, have each time been actively involved 
in subsequent projects as well (CeRISS, 2017). 
In addition, the EU member countries Greece, 
Romania and Bulgaria have always been at the 
forefront in enhancing collaboration, as they had 
the expertise in attracting funding and drafting 
proposals (Manoli, 2017). Therefore, usually the 
STI projects that had an impact were funded 
through the EC and not through a regional fund-
ing programme (Filippidis, 2017).
4. Capacity
Making financial resources available for the sci-
ence cooperation initiatives and making sure 
that there are enough skilled professionals en-
gaged in the process is of course also of utmost 
importance to implement the policies effective-
ly. The willingness to engage in SD thus needs 
to be backed by the needed capability to foster 
the set goals (Kingah, Amaya & Van Langen-
hove, 2016: 17). 
4.1 Engaged and Skilled Professionals 
Programme Coordinators often had an extensive 
knowledge on how to initiate and encourage re-
gional STI cooperation processes in the region. 
Also, training and capacity building events have 
been regularly organised (BSEC, 2012). The im-
plementation of high-level policy documents or 
action plans, however, has been often missing. 
An example is the lack of implementation of 
the BSEC’s Action Plans on Science and Tech-
nology. At a certain point, it was agreed that an 
inventory would be made on the research infra-
structures in the region. However, this plan nev-
er came into action, and an inventory was never 
made. There is a broadly accepted consensus 
that the BSEC has never fully delivered on the 
implementation of S&T plans (Bonas, 2017 & 
Gajdusek, 2017). Also, in some countries, the 
willingness of scientists to go abroad or to col-
laborate internationally has been sometimes 
low. Nevertheless, most countries have showed 
to be very strong in international collaboration, 
like Ukraine and Georgia. Remarkable is that 
most countries and researchers have been very 
determined to work together despite the politi-
cal issues, although the will to fund themselves 
is sometimes absent (Gajdusek, 2017). 
As also confirmed in the European Commis-
sion’s Review on the BSS (2015: 9-10), it has 
been sometimes difficult to implement plans 
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due to weak political commitment of some part-
ners and due to a gap between high-level policy 
makers and stakeholders. The EC thus recog-
nised that the impact of the EU’s assistance re-
mains limited in the region unless there is suf-
ficient commitment from the littoral countries. 
It was suggested that in the future, in order for 
the projects to be successful, not necessarily 
all partners had to be involved in the projects. 
Also, with the changing political situation in the 
BSR, a more flexible approach was suggested, 
‘allowing partners to opt in and out depending 
on their willingness, capacity and readiness to 
participate’. 
As some countries have become Associate 
Countries to H2020 and all others have a broad 
access to funding, a supportive environment 
that simultaneously facilitates the free move-
ment of the researchers has been enabled.  Sci-
ence networks and forums which include in-
ter alia research centres and NGOs other than 
government institutions (such as academies of 
science) have also been set up by the EU, and 
occasionally by BSR countries themselves. Ex-
amples are the Black Sea Research Network, 
the Black Sea NGO Network, the Black Sea Uni-
versities Network, etc. (UEFISCDI, 2013: 19-14). 
4.2 Investing Financial Resources on SD
When the BSS was launched, there was no 
separate budget line foreseen for the BSR. The 
implementation was thus dependent on the 
pre-decided European Neighbourhood Partner-
ship Instrument (ENPI) and other funds, like 
pre-accession funds for Turkey, external assis-
tance instruments and the Regional Develop-
ment Fund. From the beginning of 2009 until 
2015, the EU has invested nearly 140 million 
euro in the region in total (European Commis-
sion, 2007: 9).
The EU has also financially invested in S&T 
cooperation initiatives for the region. The very 
first project under FP6, BS-RESPOT, had a to-
tal cost of 506,059 euro, of which the EU con-
tributed 480,000 euro, and was coordinated by 
Greece (European Commission: 2014a). Under 
FP7, the EU had contributed 63.1 million euro 
to 20 science projects where Black Sea coun-
tries participated. For the specific initiative 
that was aimed at networking and coopera-
tion, BS-ERA.NET (2009-2012), 2.191.788 euro 
were foreseen (European Commission 2015). 
Also for the SEAS-ERA project (2010-2014), 
which linked the three European seas, the EU 
contributed 2 million euro (SEAS-ERA, 2017). 
Other important science networking initiatives 
were the Black Sea Scene project (2005- 2008) 
and the following UP-GRADE BS-SCENE pro-
ject (2009-2011) that aimed at establishing a 
network of leading research institutes in the 
BSR. The EU contributed every time the bulk of 
the cost, with 2 million euro for the former pro-
ject and 3,400,000 euro for the latter. The Black 
Sea Horizon project (2015-2018) has received 
1,500,000 euro under Horizon 2020 (European 
Commission, 2017a).
Other important cooperation initiatives were 
for example IncoNet EECA (Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia) and IncoNet EaP (Eastern 
Partnership), which aimed at creating S&T 
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synergies across regions and in which many 
BS countries were involved. The first initiative 
received 3,550,000 euro from the European 
Commission, and the latter received 3 million 
euro (European Commission 2017b). Some 
countries like Russia and Ukraine, on the other 
hand, work through bilateral agreements. The 
ERANET.RUS actions, for example, led to 94 
collaborative projects with 27.4 million fund-
ing – of which Russia contributed 6.5 million 
euro (European Commission 2016). 
Joint funding is thus more a reality when coop-
erating with the Russian Federation than with 
BS countries in S&T. All BSEC countries had 
and still have a very high expectation of the 
EU when it comes to funding, but also when 
it comes to output and delivering results (Gaj-
dusek, 2017). Although there was a general will 
and eagerness to participate under the FP7 and 
H2020 programmes, funding never seemed to 
be on the BS countries’ agenda. This even be-
comes clear when looking at the EU’s contribu-
tion in comparison to the total cost of all the 
BS-EU S&T cooperation initiatives. 
5. Acceptance 
Even if there is EU willingness and capacity to 
engage in SD, it could fall short because there is 
a lack of credibility or legitimacy of the EU in the 
area of SD. Especially buy-in from national and 
regional actors and the desire of other regional 
organisations to recognise and accept the EU 
as a forerunner in SD would count as evidence 
of acceptance in the BSR (Kingah, Amaya & Van 
Langenhove, 2016: 20). 
5.1 Buy-in from National and Regional 
Politicians 
The launching of the EaP in 2009 was not met 
with the same enthusiasm by all neighbours, es-
pecially by Russia, as it had not been involved 
in the EaP. On the other hand, the political elites 
of the three South Caucasus states welcomed 
the EaP as it would upgrade its relations with 
the EU (Manoli 2012: 434). Today, Turkey and 
Russia prefer to keep the status quo in the re-
gion instead of encouraging the regionalisation 
process. Moreover, many have stopped believ-
ing in BS regional cooperation along the lines 
of the EU and some have proposed other, more 
sustainable models of cooperation for the re-
gion. The failure of the BSEC to generate real 
implementation of its envisaged policies (Trian-
taphyllou, 2012: 5), and growing criticism on the 
EU’s policies towards the BSR as many regional 
initiatives have not been effective (Triantaphyl-
lou, 2016: 9) constitute key reasons.
Regardless of this critique, there is still this EU 
‘gravitational pull’, as most cooperation funds 
come from the EU and it is still the centre of grav-
ity for economic activity for the region (Manoli 
2010). Especially in science, there is still sub-
stantial willingness to cooperate with the EU. 
The Black Sea Horizon is supporting an exten-
sive network of regional partners in science, of 
which most have also cooperated in previous 
programmes. Also in EU-Russia S&T coopera-
tion, both Russia and the EU have been eager 
to increase their efforts (European Commis-
sion, 2016). There is even this phenomenon of 
‘positive competition’, as all BS countries want 
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to step up their results in the STI environment. 
This works in both ways. On the one hand, there 
is the EU practice of showcasing and highlight-
ing good practices, which induces the other 
countries to also step up in their efforts. On the 
other hand, some countries are also encour-
aged by their own government to participate in 
EU H2020 projects. In Turkey, researchers even 
get a financial reward when they submit a pro-
posal for a H2020 call. When their proposal is 
being accepted, the award even gets higher. Ar-
menia and Georgia are following Turkey in this 
practice (Bonas, 2017). 
5.2 Acceptance Beyond the EU: 
Other Regional and International 
Organisations
Regarding the BSEC, cooperation with the EU in 
the area of S&T was greatly encouraged from 
the start and this committed stance has been 
repeated in the BSEC action plan on coopera-
tion in S&T for the period of 2010-2014 and 
2014-2018, and in the meanwhile also in the 
BSEC plan of action for the period 2012-2014. 
More coordination and cooperation at the re-
gional and international level was encouraged, 
with a particular focus on the EU. The EU FP7 
was recognised to hold a prominent place in this 
endeavour, as it involved also many of the BSEC 
member states (BSEC, 2010). In the Plan of Ac-
tion of the BSEC working group on cooperation 
in S&T, the importance of the EU Framework 
Programmes came forward as well, as syner-
gies with other international programmes was 
one of the general objectives (BSEC, 2012). In 
2014, BSEC stated that ‘several significant pro-
jects had been successfully implemented with 
the participation of various organisations from 
the BSEC Member States as well as the Inter-
national Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) 
in different EU Research and Development Pro-
grammes’ and that, in this context, ‘sharing ex-
periences and good practices within the BSEC 
and close cooperation with innovation forerun-
ners in the EU and beyond, is essential…’ (BSEC, 
2014).
The EU also tried to join the Bucharest Con-
vention and was therefore an observer to the 
Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea 
against Pollution (which is the intergovernmen-
tal body established in the implementation of 
the Convention) and has provided financial sup-
port, but an official accession has not yet been 
granted. In addition, the EU has been working 
together with the General Fisheries Commission 
for the Mediterranean, which is also active in the 
Black Sea (European Commission, 2015: 9). 
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6. Conclusions 
After 10 years of BSS and 25 years of BSEC, there 
are still many challenges that should be dealt 
with in order to achieve better regional coopera-
tion. Cooperation with the EU, but also within the 
BSR, has been moving extremely slowly or has 
not made any progress at all. Addressing the 
unresolved conflicts in several areas and build-
ing common goals, political will and more com-
mitment are essential to obtain more results in 
the region. Also, providing more co-financing 
and engaging the private sector and civil soci-
ety could contribute to this. More recently, the 
development of regional programmes has also 
been taking place in a precarious geopolitical 
context. For most cooperation topics, it seems 
that the BS countries are trying to keep the bal-
ance between the ‘bigger players’ in the region, 
whilst those prefer to maintain the status quo 
and do not wish to move regional integration 
forward. 
However, most regional partners (national acad-
emies of science, research centres, universities, 
private stakeholders, etc.) have been keen to 
participate in EU-funded science cooperation 
projects. Significant effort has been made from 
both the side of the EU and the BSR partners to 
enhance regional and inter-regional cooperation 
in the area of science. Also Turkey and the Rus-
sian Federation have been eager to take part in 
the EU’s FP7 and Horizon 2020 projects. Many 
of the programmes did indeed enhance integra-
tion of the BS countries into the ERA or spurred 
dialogue on STI policies. This being said, collab-
oration with the EU always went more smoothly 
when conducted bilaterally. So, even in science, 
the BS partners would display the tendency to 
rather cooperate with the EU itself than with the 
neighbouring BS countries. More efforts should 
thus be made from the side of the BS countries 
to team up in science projects instead of only 
looking at the EU partners for guidance. 
The EU’s efforts to involve the BSR in its science 
projects and frameworks had positive effects in 
terms of inter-regional integration, as the degree 
of BSR participation in EU science programmes 
was high and many countries were integrated 
into the ERA. Cooperation in science also does 
not face pronounced unwillingness of national 
or regional actors; on the contrary, most part-
ners seem very motivated to participate in the 
FP7 and H2020 framework. The absence of 
any political issues and the eagerness to gain 
more results in science projects and to receive 
funding (as that is what most BS countries ex-
pect from collaborating with the EU) seem to 
be the most important incentives for this phe-
nomenon. On the other hand, it did not have as 
much effect on regional integration processes, 
as BS countries regularly keep refusing to col-
laborate between themselves, even on non-po-
litically charged science projects. Moreover, the 
positive effects of the science initiatives didn’t 
seem to have substantial spill-over effects on 
other cooperation areas.
Based on the indicators of willingness, capac-
ity and acceptance, science has proved to be 
a most advantageous cooperation area for the 
EU and the BSR to enhance relationships and 
encourage regional integration.  Although there 
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are hurdles that still need to be overcome in this 
field as well, the neutral and non-political envi-
ronment could probably induce more willing-
ness in the BSR to open up and start cooperat-
ing among themselves, and not only bilaterally 
with the EU, Turkey or the Russian Federation. 
In this context, the EU science cooperation pro-
jects with the region can only partially be seen 
as a good example of SD, as it did indeed im-
prove the relationship between the EU and the 
BS countries, but not between the BS countries 
itself. In that sense, the EU did indeed have an 
impact on inter-regional processes and was rec-
ognised to be a leader and forerunner in the field 
of science. It is therefore imperative to keep in-
vesting in these projects, as they have a lot of 
potential and it keeps an important communi-
cation channel with this region open. Especially 
now diplomatic contacts have been limited due 
to political tensions between particular coun-
tries and the EU, an argument can be made to 
encourage and ensure the proper functioning of 
the Horizon 2020 projects in the BSR, as their 
non-political nature could ameliorate relations 
between these countries in other areas in the 
long term. 
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7. Footnotes
1 The BSS comprises the littoral states (Rus-
sian Federation, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Turkey, Georgia) as well as Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Greece and Moldova.
2 Interestingly, the BSEC member countries are 
the same countries as in the BSS + Serbia and 
Albania. Six of these countries have been part 
of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics (USSR) as well.
3 The ICBSS functions as a think tank and re-
search center for the entire Black Sea area 
and works closely with the BSEC as it is a re-
lated body to the organisation.
4 Science cooperation which improves bi-and 
multilateral relations. There is thus a distinc-
tion made between pure science projects that 
involve multiple countries and science initia-
tives that aspire to enhance regional coopera-
tion and better relationships between coun-
tries through this channel.
5 For example in National Academies of Sci-
ence, ministries of science, think tanks…
6 the joint initiative involving the EU and its 
member states and 6 eastern European part-
ners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine.
7 The current EU funding programme for re-
search and innovation (2014- 2020).
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FP4- INCO IC-INTAS  
(1993-…) 











‘International Association to 
promote cooperation between sci-
entists from Western Europe and 
scientists from the independent 
states of the former Soviet Union.’
http://cordis.europa.eu/
programme/rcn/493_en.html 









‘The main aim of the BS-RESPOT 
project had been to identify the 
most promising field for coop-
eration in S&T among the BSEC 
countries and between BSEC and 
EU. In addition, particular attention 
had been given to the role and po-
tential of the National Academies 
of Sciences, and on the role and 








‘The project SCOPE-EAST intended 
to take sustainable steps in view 
of an enhanced coordination of 
the R&D cooperation of interested 
EU-Member States and Associ-
ated Candidate States with Russia 
and Eastern Europe. SCOPE-EAST 
addressed the question of how to 
achieve optimum coherence be-
tween national cooperation strate-
gies and the EU R&D cooperation 
strategy and of how cooperation in 
R&D can contribute to other poli-
cies of the EU such as the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy. Target 
countries of SCOPE-EAST were in 
the first step Russia and Ukraine.’
http://cordis.europa.eu/
result/rcn/47377_en.html 







51 partners of 
which 43 are lo-





‘To gather a Black Sea Scientific 
Network of leading research insti-
tutes, universities and NGO’s from 
the countries around the Black 
Sea and to develop a virtual data 
and information infrastructure that 
is populated and maintained by 
these organisations to improve the 
identification, access, exchange, 
quality indication and use of their 
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‘In essence, SEE-ERA.NET PLUS 
is the next step in further integrat-
ing the Western Balkan countries 
(WBC) and selected key research 
communities into the European 
Research Area. It will further en-
hance the coordination of bilateral 
R&D cooperation with WBC. The 
main objective of SEE-ERA.NET 
PLUS is to launch and implement 
























regional ‘Promote business and entrepre-
neurship and protect the environ-
ment and reduce marine litter 
(improving of joint environmental 
monitoring and promoting of com-
mon awareness raising and joint 






ing on S&T 











‘BS-ERA.NET is a networking 
project aimed at integrating the 
participating countries from the 
Black Sea extended region in the 
European Research Area by linking 
research activities within existing 











Russia, EU MS Hybrid inter- 
regionalism
‘The major objective of ERA.Net 
RUS Plus is to deepen the trans-
national collaboration between EU 
MS/AC and Russia and to reduce 
the fragmentation of research pro-
grammes along national funding 
lines. This joint undertaking will 
create synergies and strengthen 


















‘SEAS-ERA aims at embracing ma-
rine and maritime research in its 
entirety, overarching the previous 
initiatives which only targeted a 
given area or basin and, therefore, 
constituting a stable and durable 
structure for empowering and 


























Regional ‘The Central European Initiative 
(CEI) strongly supports trans-
national mobility of scientists and 


























‘To support and facilitate a bi-
regional EU – EECA S&T policy 
dialogue and, in the case of Russia 
and Ukraine, a complementary 
bilateral S&T policy dialogue in-
volving stakeholders from policy 
making, science community and 
industry. The dialogue will address 
national S&T potential, policy 
goals and demands in order to 
define common priorities and to 
develop respective joint scenarios 
and implementation strategies 

















al: EU and 
BSR
‘The project aims to support the 
EU’s external relations with the tar-
get region by significantly contrib-
uting to ongoing bi-regional and 
regional Science, Technology and 
Innovation (STI) policy dialogues, 
and by increasing the knowledge 
base about the EU’s external 
environment. It also stresses to 
stimulate bi-regional STI coopera-
tion and to strengthen the EU’s 
economic competitiveness as well 
as to contribute to the establish-
ment of supportive framework con-
ditions by facilitating the pooling 
of resources and by identifying 


















‘The partnership aims to provide 
support and assistance for re-
forms in the region in the fields of 
democracy, human rights, mar-
ket economy, sustainability and 
governance. As part of its digital 
agenda the Eastern Partnership 
recognises the importance of 
e-Infrastructures in: Promoting 
digital inclusion, stopping brain 
drain, Procuring and federating 
access to high-quality scientific 
content, Enabling participation 









the Baltic, Adriatic 




‘PlanCoast had the aim to develop 
the tools and capacities for an 
effective integrated planning in 
coastal zones and maritime areas 
















regional ‘INOGATE is one of the longest 
running energy technical assis-
tance programmes funded by the 
European Union. It works within 
the policy frameworks of the Baku 
Initiative and the Eastern Partner-
ship. INOGATE cooperates with 
11 Partner Countries to support a 
reduction in their dependency on 
fossil fuels and imports, improve 
the security of their energy sup-
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Annex 2: The post-Soviet states balance collaboration with Eastern and Western Europe 
Main foreign partners, 2008–2014 (number of papers) 
1st collaborator 2nd collaborator 3rd collaborator 4th collaborator 5th collaborator 
Armenia USA (1 346) Germany (1 333) France/Rus. Fed. (1 247) Italy (1 191) 
Azerbaijan Turkey (866) Russian Fed. (573) USA (476) Germany (459) UK (413) 
Belarus Russian Fed. (2 059) Germany (1 419) Poland (1 204) USA (1 064) France (985) 
Georgia USA (1 153) Germany (1 046) Russian Fed. (956) UK (924) Italy (909) 
Moldova Germany (276) USA (235) Russian Fed. (214) Romania (197) France (153) 
Turkey USA (10 591) Germany (4 580) UK (4 036) Italy (3 314) France (3 009) 
Ukraine Russian Fed. (3 943) Germany (3 882) USA (3 546) Poland (3 072) France (2 451) 
Source: UNESCO (2015), UNESCO Science Report: towards 2030, Paris: UNESCO Publishing, p. 323
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